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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Employment discrimination continues to infect many employers.1  
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1
  As Professor Charles A. Sullivan recently stated, there is ―widespread scholarly consensus that 
discrimination remains prevalent in the American workplace.‖  Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from 
the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 59 ALA. L. REV. (Forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 
16–17), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099595 (link).  Professor Sul-
livan explains that the continuing prevalence of discrimination has been documented in the legal litera-
ture in three main forms: statistical, pervasive implicit bias such as stereotyping, and field experiments 
which demonstrate that employer‘s actually discriminate.  He then cites to a number of academic articles 
supporting each of these propositions.  Id. at 17 n.83. 
2
  See Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that employment 
discrimination is often subtle and insidious); Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (noting that employers rarely leave a paper trail or smoking gun attesting to a discriminatory 
intent); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that most employ-
ers will deny discrimination and point to an alleged deficiency in order to plausibly blame the employee 
for the discipline imposed). 
Plaintiffs alleging discrimination in the workplace fare worse at trial than plaintiffs in just about any 
other type of litigation.  See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUDIES 429, 443–44 (2004).  In cases where 
employment discrimination plaintiffs manage to prevail, they face a higher reversal rate as compared 
with other forms of civil actions.  Id. at 449–452; see also Sullivan, supra note 1, at 16 & n.82 (stating 
that few employment discrimination cases result in plaintiff verdicts and collecting scholarly literature 
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say discusses the use of ―me too‖ evidence where parties, usually plaintiffs, 
seek to buttress their case by pointing to other employees who assert that 
they were infected by the same disease of discrimination.  Even before the 
Supreme Court‘s first decision discussing this critically important issue, 
Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn,3 the use of ―me too‖ evi-
dence was controversial.4  It is important to analyze this case because em-
ployment discrimination cases often turn on whether the plaintiff has been 
able to come up with an appropriate ―comparator‖ who was treated diffe-
rently than he or she was.5 
In examining the significance of Sprint, it is also important to be aware 
of the general evidentiary environment that governs federal court litigation.  
Under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), there is a low 
threshold for the admissibility of evidence: the evidence in question has to 
―only slightly affect[] the trier‘s assessment of the probability of the matter 
to be proved.‖6  Additionally, as the Seventh Circuit explicitly stated, Rule 
403 ―tilts in favor of admissibility.‖7  Because the search for truth is impe-
riled by the exclusion of what would otherwise be relevant evidence, courts 
are required to exclude evidence under 403 only ―sparingly.‖8  Thus, under 
this standard, courts are required to give the evidence its maximum reason-
able probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.9 
Another significant evidentiary doctrine is that the law of evidence dis-
tinguishes between the admissibility of evidence and the weight that such 
evidence is too be afforded.10  Stated somewhat differently, anecdotal evi-
dence need not be dispositive to be relevant and therefore admissible.11 
                                                                                                                           
supporting same); 2 MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:1 
(2007) (disparate treatment cases of employment discrimination are often difficult to prove). 
3
  128 S.Ct. 1140 (2008) (link). 
4
  See 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 72–73 
(4th ed. 2007) (defining ―me too‖ evidence as ―[e]vidence concerning other alleged discriminates.‖). 
5
  Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1. 
6
  2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN‘S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 
401.04[2][c][ii] (Joseph M. McLaughlin , ed., 2d ed. 1997). 
7
  Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2006). 
8
  2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 6, at § 403.02[2][a]. 
9
  See id. 
10
  See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983) (link) (stating that the weight given to admissi-
ble evidence is left to the finder of facts); see also  1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN,  supra note 4, at 72 
(weight of remarks alleged to be discriminatory is ―fact-sensitive and not reducible to a precise formu-
la‖); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) (link) (―The trier 
of fact should consider all the evidence giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves.‖). 
11
  See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (link) (noting that evidence suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, while admissible, may not itself conclusively es-
tablish that the actions in question were motivated by discrimination); see also Dechman v. Stahl 
Specialty Co., No. 06-00288-CV-W-HFS, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20042 (D. Mo. March 13, 2008).  In 
Dechman, an age discrimination case, the court gave virtually no weight to a statement by a nondeci-
sionmaker concerning older employees in general.  See id. at *27–28.  While the court did not expressly 
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It is also clear that the context of the ―me too‖ evidence will also mat-
ter.  This is because context almost always matters when interpreting wit-
ness statements.12  Therefore, it may not even be possible for the Court to 
ultimately lay down a specific rule applicable to all cases.13  One thing that 
is clear, however, is that these general evidentiary principles tend to support 
the introduction of evidence.  But these principles only provide a rough 
framework for analyzing whether ―me too‖ evidence should be admissible. 
There are several easy categories of ―me too‖ cases.  Those categories 
include attempts to prove the presence of a culture or atmosphere of dis-
crimination,14 attempts to establish the existence of a hostile work environ-
ment,15 and attempts to show a pattern or practice of discrimination16 where 
the ―me too‖ evidence concerns the same decisionmaker as the plaintiff.17  
However, the answer to the question of whether such evidence can be ad-
mitted where, as in Sprint, different supervisors are involved is not easy. 
Though scholars have characterized the Sprint decision as a ―judicial 
punt‖ because of its remand on procedural grounds,18 this Essay asserts that 
                                                                                                                           
rule on the admissibility of this evidence, it is apparent that it found such evidence admissible because it 
referred to it in its opinion granting the employer summary judgment.  See id. at *27–30. 
12
  See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, 546 U.S. 454, 455 (2006) (per curiam) (link) (holding that the use 
of the word ―boy‖ in the workplace may not always be evidence of racial animus because its meaning 
may vary depending upon the statement‘s context—including tone of voice, local custom, and historical 
usage); Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that ―stray re-
marks‖ by nondecisionmakers may be admissible depending upon the circumstances as well as the con-
text). 
13
  Indeed, in the first appellate decision to cite Sprint, the Tenth Circuit merely stated that ―me too 
evidence was admissible in certain instances‖ without giving any indication what those instances are.  
Goodson v. Nat‘l Assoc. of Letter Carriers, No. 07-1187, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5387, *4 n.2 (10th Cir. 
March 13, 2008). 
14
  See e.g., Velazequez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of P.R., Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 18–19 (1st Cir. 1979); 
Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 595 (6th Cir. 2006); Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 
F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2006). 
15
  Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1285–87 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that ―me 
too‖ evidence was admissible to prove an intent to retaliate against any black employee who complained 
about racial slurs, a hostile work environment due to the repeated use of racial slurs, and an atmosphere 
of discrimination in the workplace). 
16
  See e.g., Int‘l. Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977) (link).  Pattern or 
practice cases involve claims that the alleged discriminatory conduct is part of the employer‘s standard 
operating procedure, and such cases are often brought as class actions.  1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, 
supra note 4, at 104.  Under this theory of employment discrimination, to establish liability much more 
than mere isolated or sporadic remarks must be shown.  ROSSEIN, supra note 2, at § 2:28. 
By contrast, disparate treatment involves allegations of discrimination directed against an individual 
plaintiff.  1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 104.  See also Bacon v. Honda of America 
Mfg., 370 F.3d 565, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1151 (2005) (distinguishing between 
pattern and practice cases and individual disparate treatment cases). 
17
  See, e.g., Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1286. 
18
  See Sullivan, supra note 1 at 5; Paul M. Secunda, “Me Too” ADEA Evidence Decision Unanim-
ously Reversed and Remanded on Deference Grounds, Workplace Prof Blog (Feb. 26, 2008), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/02/me-too-adea-evi.html (link). 
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Sprint will turn out to be significant to the developing employment discrim-
ination jurisprudence.  This is principally because of dicta in Justice Tho-
mas‘ unanimous opinion, which implicitly approves of the use of such 
evidence.  While it may be difficult to precisely define the line between 
admissible and inadmissible ―me too‖ evidence, it is clear that the Court re-
jected any type of rule that would flatly prohibit the introduction of ―me 
too‖ evidence simply because the putative witnesses did not share the same 
supervisor as the plaintiff. 
This Essay asserts that the use of ―me too‖ evidence is likely to signifi-
cantly increase as a result of the notoriety of the Sprint decision and the in-
creasing importance of comparative-type evidence to employment 
discrimination litigation.19  Part I of this Essay discusses the state of affairs 
involving ―me too‖ cases leading up to the Sprint decision.  Part II then dis-
cusses the Sprint decision itself and explains why the Supreme Court deci-
sion is significant.20  This Essay concludes by postulating how both 
employers and employees may try to make use of the Sprint decision in fu-
ture employment discrimination litigation. 
I. THE USE OF ―ME TOO‖ EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS PRIOR TO 
SPRINT 
Prior to Sprint, the law on ―me too‖ evidence was in a state of disar-
ray.21  Three circuits had held that such evidence was irrelevant under FRE 





  Indeed, in the Sprint Supreme Court case, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, ap-
pearing as amicus curiae in support of Sprint, asserted that ―it is routine for individual plaintiffs to try to 
buttress their cases by proffering the testimony of other employees who allege that they, too, were the 
victims of discrimination.‖  Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States Of America as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 2007 WL 2401705 at *4 (Aug. 20, 2007); see also Charles C. 
Warner, Motions in Limine in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 823, 828 
(1999) (stating that in employment discrimination litigation testimony from coworkers is frequently of-
fered). 
20
  Indeed, a well known management-side employment law firm in its ―Client Alert‖ newsletter 
characterized the Sprint case as ―discouraging‖ and not what employers had been hoping for. U.S. Su-
preme Court Rules That “Me Too” Evidence Is Neither Per Se Admissible Nor Per Se Inadmissible, 




  The leading employment discrimination treatise described the state of the law with respect to ―me 
too‘ evidence as follows: 
Some courts find it inadmissible in an individual disparate treatment case, either as irrelevant or 
because it would needlessly consume time or confuse the jury with trials-within-a-trial.  Some oth-
er courts, though have allowed such evidence in individual cases.  And such evidence is highly re-
levant in representative actions because, by definition, the plaintiffs must prove discrimination 
affecting a group. 
1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 72–73.  
22
  See Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 
F.2d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 1985); Wyvill v. United Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 2000); Wil-
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Haskell, for example, the Second Circuit reversed a jury verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff, reasoning that the testimony of six other employees ―provided 
no basis for an inference of discrimination‖ because the circumstances of 
those six employees bore no logical relationship to the plaintiff.23 
Additionally, two of those circuits concluded that even if such evi-
dence were admissible under FRE 401, it should be excluded under FRE 
403 as prejudicial.24  Reflective of this reasoning is the Sixth Circuit‘s deci-
sion in Schrand v. Federal Pacific Electric Co.,25 where the court stated: 
[T]he impact of the two former employees‘ testimony would be great.  Thus, 
even if that evidence were relevant, we believe its probative value was sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice flowing from its ad-
mission.  Although it had no direct bearing on the issue to be decided—
whether [the plaintiff] was discharged because of his age—this testimony em-
bellished the circumstantial evidence directed to that issue . . . [with] an emo-
tional element that was otherwise lacking as a basis for a verdict in [the 
plaintiff‘s] favor.26 
On the other hand, three circuits have held that it is a reversible error 
not to admit such evidence—at least under the facts presented in the indi-
vidual cases under review.27  Thus, in Spulak v. K Mart Corp.,28 the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court to admit anecdotal evidence 
involving an official other than the plaintiff‘s supervisor because the simi-
larity of the circumstances under which the plaintiff and the witness were 
fired outweighed the fact that separate supervision was involved.29  Indeed, 
in the Tenth Circuit decision in Sprint, the court followed this logic by con-
cluding that ―me too‖ evidence from other employees with different super-
visors, who experienced that same reduction in force, was admissible.30 
Judge Posner aptly summarized the law in this area as follows: 
Given the difficulty of proving employment discrimination—the employer will 
deny it, and almost every worker has some deficiency on which the employer 
can plausibly blame the workers‘ troubles—a flat rule that evidence of other 
discriminatory acts by . . . the employer can never be admitted without violat-
                                                                                                                           
liams v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1130 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Moorhouse v. Boeing Co., 
501 F. Supp. 390, 392 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 639 F.2d 774 (table) (3d Cir. 1980). 
23
  Haskell, 743 F. 2d at 121. 
24
  See Wyvill, 213 F.3d at 303; Williams, 132 F.3d at 1130; Schrand v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 
851 F.2d 152, 155–56 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Moorhouse, 501 F. Supp. at 393, aff’d, 639 F.2d 774 (ta-
ble) (3d Cir. 1980). 
25
  851 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1988).  
26
  Id. at 156. 
27
  Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423 (7th Cir. 1986); Phillip v. ANR Freight 
Sys., Inc., 945 F.2d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 1991); Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156 n.2 (10th 
Cir. 1990). 
28
  894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990). 
29
  Id. at 1156. 
30
  Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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ing Rule 403 would be unjustified.  Such evidence will often flunk Rule 403 
because the acts are remote in time or place . . . but not in all cases, and not in 
this one.31 
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, ultimately held that the 
proffered ―me too‖ evidence was admissible and relevant to the claim that 
the employer condoned racial harassment and in rebutting the employer‘s 
asserted defense that it fired the plaintiff for cause.32 
Thus, both sides of the issue have some good arguments.  There is cer-
tainly some merit to the argument that testimony of other employees who 
do not share the same supervisor should not be admitted because the cir-
cumstances are simply different.  Additional support for this can be found 
by examining precedent, which has focused on the decisionmaker‘s state of 
mind because to find liability, intentional discrimination must be estab-
lished.33  There is also some reason to be concerned with prejudice under 
FRE 403 and with the notion that the admission of such evidence may 
create trials within trials. 
On the other hand, if the employer actually has discriminated against 
the plaintiff, it stands to reason that the employer may have taken adverse 
action against others for discriminatory reasons as well.  Therefore, this 
type of evidence has at least some probative value. 
This Part of the Essay demonstrated the uncertainty in ―me too‖ cases, 
which the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify in Sprint.  Unfortu-
nately, the Court decided the case on procedural grounds, and as a result, 
the Court did not promulgate any clear legal rules. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT‘S DECISION, OR LACK THEREOF,  IN SPRINT 
The Sprint decision immediately stands out as very unusual.  First, it is 
relatively short, spanning less than nine slip opinion pages.  Second, it con-
cerns a Tenth Circuit decision in review of a ―minute order‖; the District 
Court did not even issue an opinion.34  Additionally, the case was decided 
largely on procedural grounds.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the reach 
of this decision may turn out to be controversial. 
The case started out rather unremarkably.  Sprint terminated the plain-





   Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1423. 
32
  Id.  Judge Posner also rejected the employer‘s attempt to exclude this type of evidence under FRE 
404(b) as a prior bad act.  This was because he interpreted this rule as allowing admission of bad acts to 
prove motive, intent, preparation, plan, and knowledge.  Id. at 1424. 
33
  Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003) (link). 
34
  To my knowledge, this is one of the few times that an issue contained solely in a ―minute order‖ 
made its way to the Supreme Court.  The Tenth Circuit below described this minute order simply as an 
entry on the docket sheet.  Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223 & n.1 (10th Cir. 
2006). 
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reduction in force.35  She sued Sprint and asserted a disparate treatment 
theory of discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act.36  The plaintiff sought to introduce testimony from five other Sprint 
employees who also claimed that their supervisor discriminated against 
them because of their age.  Three of these witnesses asserted that they heard 
denigrating remarks about older workers.  One of these three claimed to 
have seen a spreadsheet suggesting that a supervisor considered age in mak-
ing the layoffs.  Another asserted that he was banned from working at 
Sprint because of his age, and that he witnessed Sprint harass another em-
ployee because of her age.  The last witness alleged that Sprint had to get 
permission before hiring anyone over the age of forty, and that after he was 
terminated, he was replaced by a younger employee.  If these allegations 
were true, it is readily apparent how a jury might be influenced by such tes-
timony. 
However, none of these ―me too‖ witnesses worked in the same de-
partment as the plaintiff; none of these witnesses worked under the various 
supervisors who supervised the plaintiff; and none of these witnesses re-
ported hearing discriminatory remarks by any of the plaintiff‘s supervisors.  
At the District Court, Sprint moved to exclude testimony by the other em-
ployees by claiming that it was irrelevant under FRE 401 because different 
supervisors were involved.  Sprint also argued that any probative value to 
this testimony was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under FRE 
403. 
Remarkably, the District Court did not issue a full written opinion or 
indeed any opinion.  Instead, it issued a minute order that stated: ―Plaintiff 
may offer evidence of discrimination against Sprint employees who are si-
milarly situated to her.  ‗Similarly situated employees,‘ for the purpose of 
this ruling, requires proof that (1) Paul Ruddick [sic] was the decision-
maker in any adverse employment action; and (2) temporal proximity.‖37 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, interpreted the district court‘s minute or-
der as a per se rule that evidence from employees with different supervisors 





  The Supreme Court did not specifically refer to the plaintiff‘s age.  However, the Tenth Circuit 
stated that the plaintiff was age fifty-one.  Id. at n. 1224.  The specific age of the plaintiff was not rele-
vant in this case as she was over age forty—the threshold for protection under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a), (b) (2000) (link). 
36
  Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S.Ct. 1140, 1143 (2008).  There are two principal 
theories of employment discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact, also known as adverse 
impact.  ROSSEIN, supra note 2, § 2:1.  Disparate treatment involves treating employees differently be-
cause of a protected classification such as a person‘s sex.  The focus is on the employer‘s motive.  Id. § 
2:2.  By contrast, disparate impact cases involve facially neutral selection devices or criteria dispropor-
tionately affecting employees of a protected group.  Proof discriminatory intent is not required.  Id. § 
2:30. 
37
  Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S.Ct. 1140, 1145 (2008) (quoting Appendix to Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari at 24a, Sprint/United Mgmt. Co, 128 S.Ct. 1140 (March 5, 2007)). 
38
  See Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1225. 
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its own analysis of this issue, concluding that the evidence in question was 
relevant39 and not unduly prejudicial,40 and therefore remanded the case for 
a new trial.41  Certiorari was granted to determine if ―me too‖ evidence 
would only be admissible if it involved the same individuals who super-
vised the plaintiff.42 
Before the Supreme Court, the parties focused on two issues.  First, 
whether the evidence was relevant under Rule 401 and second, even if such 
evidence were admissible, whether it could be excluded as unduly prejudi-
cial under Rule 403.43  The Court held, however, that the Tenth Circuit erred 
in concluding that the district court applied a per se rule of inadmissibility.  
The Supreme Court concluded that there was an unclear basis for the dis-
trict court‘s ruling, and therefore, a remand was necessary.44 
The Court went on to explain that it is the District Court‘s role to 
weigh the evidence and make a decision in the first instance explicitly and 
on the record.  This was considered particularly important because appellate 
courts are required to pay deference to lower determinations under Rule 
403, since district courts will have heard the proffered evidence and will 
likely be more familiar with the cases.45  Thus, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Tenth Circuit also erred by deciding this issue in the first in-
stance.46 
At the end of the opinion, the Court did give some guidance about how 
it might rule in future cases.  Specifically, the Court held that ―me too‖ evi-
dence involving other supervisors is neither per se admissible or per se in-
admissible.  The Court reasoned: 
The question whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is rele-
vant in an individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, 
including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff‘s circumstances 
and theory of the case.  Applying Rule 403 to determine if evidence is prejudi-
cial also requires a fact-intensive, context-specific inquiry.47  
Additionally, in what may become the most significant part of this de-
cision, the Court stated in dicta: 
We note that, had the District Court applied a per se rule excluding the evi-
dence, the Court of Appeals would have been correct to conclude that it abused 





  Id. at 1228 
40
  Id. at 1230–31. 
41
  Id. at 1232. 
42
  Sprint/United Mgmt Co. v. Mendelsohn, 128 S.Ct. 1140, 1143 (2008). 
43
  Id. at 1144. 
44
  Id. 
45
  See id. at 1144–46. 
46
  Id. at 1146. 
47
  Id. at 1147. 
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mined in the context of the facts and arguments in a particular case, and thus 
are generally not amenable to broad per se rules . . . .  But as we have dis-
cussed, there is no basis in the record for concluding that the District Court ap-
plied a blanket rule.48 
To return to our medical metaphor, this bit of dicta provides plaintiffs 
with a shot of adrenalin that may, in some cases, cure the disease of em-
ployment discrimination.  While the Supreme Court does not provide clear 
guidance in Sprint with respect to where the line of demarcation is between 
admissible and inadmissible ―me too‖ evidence, it does endorse the view 
that such evidence can be admissible in cases not involving supervisors re-
sponsible for the adverse job decision claimed to be discriminatory. 
The facts of Sprint are also significant.  As explained by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, the only similarities to the plaintiff‘s situation were that the ―me too‖ 
employee-witnesses were terminated within a year of the plaintiff‘s termi-
nation as part of a company wide reduction in force; all were in the pro-
tected age group; and their selection to be included in the reduction in force 
was based upon similar criteria.49  As Tenth Circuit Judge Tymkovich noted 
in a lengthy dissent: 
Given the size of Sprint, the fact that Mendelsohn found five former em-
ployees who believed they were victims of age discrimination is not meaning-
ful until a specific evidentiary foundation has been laid.  The proffer of 
evidence here is devoid of independent evidence showing that Sprint had a 
company-wide discriminatory policies.50 
It is difficult to come up with a more factually remote setting than what 
occurred in Sprint.  Reductions in forces usually involve large numbers of 
employees, but the plaintiff only proffered testimony from a very small per-
centage of the workers.51  There was no finding that this reduction in force 





  Id. at 1147 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee‘s note (―Relevancy is not an inherent 
characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a 
matter properly provable in the case.‖)). 
49
  Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006).  Neither the Su-
preme Court nor the Tenth Circuit described what those criteria were.  See Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 128 
S.Ct. at 1143; Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1228. 
50
  Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1232–33 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
51
  Unfortunately, neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court provided any statistically data 
about the number of employees employed, the number of employees subject to the reduction in force at 
issue, or the number of employees who were part of that reduction in force and over the age of forty.  
See Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 128 S.Ct. at 1143; Mendelsohn, 466 F.3d at 1225. 
52
  For a discussion of pattern or practice cases of discrimination see Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Unit-
ed States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977). 
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er‘s standard operating procedure.53  Additionally, there was no mention of 
prior discrimination in the record. 
The significance of the Supreme Court decision is not that ―me too‖ 
evidence involving different supervisors may be admitted; it is that even 
under facts as attenuated as these we know that such evidence is not per se 
inadmissible.  Stated another way, while we do not know if this evidence 
will ultimately be admissible, we do know that it is not per se inadmissible. 
Moreover, in its analysis the Supreme Court noted that the District 
Court had stated orally that the admissibility of ―me too‖ evidence involv-
ing different supervisors is different when the question becomes whether an 
employer‘s stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.54  Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court did not explain why pretext cases may be subject to a 
different rule. 
Accordingly, by virtue of the fact that the Supreme Court did not reject 
the District Court‘s ―oral clarification,‖ it can be argued that the Court im-
plicitly agreed with it.  This implies that, at least in ―pretext cases,‖ ―me 
too‖ evidence may be easier to admit.  In fairness, however, this oral clarifi-
cation may have been one of the reasons why the Court concluded that the 
District Court‘s order was unclear.  This clarification can be construed as 
conflicting with the minute order which required exclusion if different su-
pervisors were involved. 
CONCLUSION 
Some may argue that Sprint did not alter employment discrimination 
jurisprudence because all the Court actually did was to hold that the admis-
sibility of ―me too‖ evidence must be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
However, even if Sprint is read in such a restrictive fashion, it is probably 





  See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973) (link) (stating that where plain-
tiff can show a pattern of discrimination that is widespread, such evidence can demonstrate discrimina-
tion).  
54
  Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 128 S.Ct. at 1144.  Pretext is part of the allocation and burden of proof 
in employment discrimination cases.  In a series of Supreme Court decisions, the most recent being 
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003), the Court established a tripartite standard that courts 
should follow.  First, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; and second, the em-
ployer may defend itself by asserting a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; and third, in 
order to prevail, the plaintiff must prove that the articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was a 
pretext to mask discrimination.  See id. at 50 n.3 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 
530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Pugh v. Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 626 (7th 
Cir. 2001)). 
The elements of a prima facie case can vary depending upon the circumstances, but usually involve 
four elements.  In a refusal to hire case, for example, those elements are first, that the plaintiff was a 
member of a protected group; second, that the plaintiff applied for the position and was qualified for it; 
third, that the plaintiff was rejected; and fourth, that the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants.  ROSSEIN, supra note 2, § 2:4. 
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because many employment discrimination plaintiffs operate in an environ-
ment where so little medicine in the form of evidentiary proof is available. 
This Essay asserts, however, that Sprint will result in many more ―me 
too‖ types of comparative witness testimony being admitted into evidence.  
As noted, this is mainly because, under facts so attenuated, the fact that 
such ―me too‖ evidence was not inadmissible implies that it might be ad-
missible.55  
While the plaintiff‘s bar may rejoice at the Sprint decision, Sprint may 
also open evidentiary opportunities for employers.  Though not addressed 
per se in the Sprint decision itself, another body of law may support the no-
tion that ―me too‖ evidence is not just a tool for plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination litigation.  As the Supreme Court stated in Furnco Construc-
tion Corp. v Waters: 
[T]he employer must be allowed some latitude to introduce evidence which 
bears on his motive.  Proof that his work force was racially balanced or that it 
contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not 
wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent . . . .56 
Additionally, the Supreme Court later held that the fact that an earlier 
court decision found that the defendant employer had not engaged in a sys-





  For examples of pre-Sprint cases admitting comparable ―me too‖ evidence involving witnesses 
who had different supervisors than the plaintiff see supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
Though this Essay reads Sprint as widening the scope of admissible ―me too‖ evidence, I acknowl-
edge that the few post-Sprint decisions thus far have been divided in their reading of Sprint.  Like this 
Essay, Elion v. Jackson, Civ. No. 05-0992, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27520 (D.D.C. April 7, 2008) inter-
prets the Court‘s refusal to establish a per se rule to permit the admission of ―me too‖ evidence in favor 
of the employer-defendant, notwithstanding the fact that there was no indication that the employee-
witnesses had the same supervisor as the plaintiff did.  See id. at *17–22.  The district court found one 
employee-witness and the plaintiff similarly situated because they were both women and the employee-
witness was promoted and given extra responsibility at roughly the same time that the plaintiff‘s divi-
sion was disbanded.  See id. at *17–20  The court found testimony from the other comparator relevant to 
the plaintiff‘s claims of racial discrimination because both she and the plaintiff were African American.  
Id. at 20–22. 
On the other hand, Opsatnik v. Northfolk Sourthern Corp., Civ. No. 06-81, 2008 U.S. Dist Lexis 
26727 (W.D. Pa. March 20, 2008) and Sgro v. Bloomberg, Civ. No. 05-731, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
27175 (D. N.J. March 31, 2008) read Sprint more restrictively.  Opsatnik found that the plaintiff and 
comparators were not ―similarly situated‖ because they worked in different divisions and had different 
supervisors, and the court therefore refused to admit ―me too‖ evidence.  Opsatnik, 2008 U.S. Dist Lexis 
26727, at *19–25.  Sgro, an age-discrimination case, held that testimony about a nondecisionmaking su-
pervisor was not relevant without a showing that the supervisor in question was involved in employment 
decisions affecting the plaintiff.  Srgo, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27175, at *31–35. 
56
  438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (link).  Additionally, the Supreme Court later repeated in St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1993) (link), that ―[a] disproportionate minority makeup 
of [a] company‘s work force‖ could be used by an employer to defend itself against charges of discrimi-
nation.  More recently, the employer-defender in Elion v. Jackson, Civ. No. 05-0992, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 27520 (D.D.C. April 7, 2008) attempted to use ―me too‖ evidence from an African-American 
woman and a Caucasian woman to contest claims of gender and racial discrimination. 
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in a later individual disparate treatment case.57  This type of comparative 
evidence has some probative similarity to ―me too‖ witness testimony. 
Even if employers attempt to use ―me too‖ evidence, as employees 
surely will, on balance, such evidence will probably benefit employees 
more than employers.  Why?  Employers already have access to information 
and evidence.  Additionally, another employee testifying about the discrim-
ination he or she suffered is something that a jury can relate to, and will 
likely be interpreted by a jury to have more probative weight than, for ex-
ample, testimony from a minority witness proffered by the employer to 
state that ―he too‖ never experienced any racial discrimination.  An em-
ployer offering such evidence runs the risk that it would be interpreted by a 
jury as a racial cliché, similar to a statement like ―some of my best friends 
are black.‖ 
While the exact probative value of ―me too‖ evidence may be unclear, 
if this Essay is correct in concluding that Sprint is going to result in much 
more ―me too‖ evidence being admitted, the end result may be more expan-
sive plaintiff discovery requests seeking out comparative employees and 
where such evidence is found, lengthier trials.58  Additionally, because the 
Court did not definitively resolve the issue, there likely will be additional 





  Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984) (link); see also supra 
note 16 and accompanying text (describing pattern and practice cases of discrimination). 
58
  Cf. Warner, supra note 19, at 829 (arguing that if ―me too‖ evidence were admissible, employers 
would be faced with the choice of defending each individual claim or leaving the testimony unrebutted). 
